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T
he use of federal funds futures derivative
contracts has grown remarkably over the
past decade. Commercial banks, corpo-
rations, and other market participants
use these contracts to hedge interest
rate risk and to speculate on interest
rate movements. In addition to acting as a useful
hedging tool, the contract prices also provide an
information externality, implicitly reflecting the
markets’ view of the federal funds rate’s expected
path. More than a decade of federal funds futures
market data, spanning two recessions and numerous
monetary policy cycles, is now available and pro-
vides sufficient information to draw conclusions relat-
ing the behavior of federal funds futures prices to
monetary policy. Because a larger amount of data was
available, this study draws more specific conclusions
than did previous research. (See Boxes 1 and 2 for
more information about derivatives and the federal
funds future market).
Earlier research addresses two main issues. First,
Carlson, McIntire, and Thomson (1995), Krueger
and Kuttner (1996), and Söderström (2001), among
others, have focused on the efficiency and predic-
tive accuracy of implied rates of federal funds
futures. Using data mostly from the early 1990s,
they find futures prices to be relatively accurate,
efficient predictors of the path of the funds rate,
with Krueger and Kuttner estimating a modest pos-
itive bias at one- and two-month horizons. 
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The second issue relates to increasing Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) information disclo-
sures and their ability to synchronize the expecta-
tions of market participants and policymakers. These
disclosures include the prompt announcement of tar-
get rate changes following FOMC meetings (since
February 1994), making target rate changes more
often at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings (a
gradual shift starting in 1994), and announcing a
bias toward output weakness or inflation risk (since
2000). A decline in futures market forecast errors
over the latter half of the 1990s is viewed as support
for the contention that greater disclosure has
resulted in greater synchronicity between actual
monetary policy and market expectations of mone-
tary policy (Poole 1999). This synchronicity should
result in improved asset pricing and more efficient
resource allocation, among other benefits. 
Previous federal funds futures market research
has generally treated futures market data as a sin-
gle sample, often out of necessity given the small
sample sizes available to early studies. But even
more recent work has generally not looked at the
relationship between federal fund futures prices
and the path of the funds rate over different time
periods. The following analysis breaks apart a
thirteen-year sample and examines futures prices
over different stages in the monetary policy cycle
and around turning points in the trajectory of pol-
icy. The analysis also investigates the relationshipT
he profits of many industries within the U.S.
economy are sensitive to changes in the term
structure of interest rates. For example, banks
may borrow short-term funds and make long-
term loans. When short-term interest rates rise,
the spread between the cost of new funds and the
interest earned on previously loaned funds
declines, adversely affecting bank profits. Given
this possibility, banks and other firms with similar
interest rate exposures may desire to protect
themselves against some or all of this risk. The
demand to hedge against interest rate risk led to
the creation and expansion of interest rate deriv-
atives markets in recent decades. There now
exist options, futures, swaps, and more complex
derivative instruments whose prices or payments
are based on movements in underlying interest
rates.1 These instruments can be used separately
or in combination to bound a firm’s exposure to
interest rate risk. 
For instance, a bank can protect itself against
increases in short-term interest rates by selling
federal funds futures contracts. If the underlying
interest rate rises, those short positions in futures
contracts will increase in value, effectively limit-
ing the rise in the costs of short-term funds over
the term of the contract. This increase offsets the
contraction of the spread between the costs of
funds and the return on loans. A similar hedge
could be accomplished with an option contract.2
BOX 1
Interest Rate Derivatives
1. For an extended introduction to interest rate derivatives, see Pitts and Fabozzi (1990).
2. Option contracts are not generally available on the underlying interest rate itself; rather, they are typically written on
futures contracts on this underlying interest rate. See Fabozzi (1996, chap. 22) for a good explanation as to why writing
options on interest rate futures is essentially equivalent to writing options on the movements of the interest rate itself.
S
tarted in late 1988 at the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT), the federal funds futures con-
tract is the most widely used futures contract that
is directly tied to the federal funds rate. The con-
tract price is based on the monthly average of the
daily effective federal funds rate as published by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.1 The sec-
ond section of this box lays out the exact specifica-
tions of the CBOT federal funds futures contract.2
Although designed as a hedging vehicle, prices
on federal funds futures contracts also contain
important information that has proved extremely
useful to Federal Reserve policymakers. Under
certain assumptions, the actions of hedgers and
speculators in the federal funds futures market
result in contract prices that represent the market
participants’ mean expectation for the future path
of the average effective federal funds rate.3 As a
result, by looking at the term structure of implied
rates on federal funds futures, policymakers are
able to assess market participants’ expectations
and understand what interest rate forecasts are
implicit in other asset prices.
The popularity of the CBOT federal funds
futures contracts has grown consistently since their
introduction. As Charts A and B demonstrate,
both volume and open interest have increased
substantially, with market participation surging
through 2001 as the FOMC aggressively reduced
the federal funds rate.
Chart C shows the composition of participants
in the federal funds futures market. The data show
banks and other hedgers to be the dominant mar-
ket participants as measured by number of posi-
tions taken. However, speculators comprise a small
but crucial segment of the market, capitalizing on
arbitrage opportunities and moving market prices
to reflect the anticipated path of monetary policy.
Federal Funds Futures Contract 
Highlights and Terminology
C
ontract months. Counting from a specific
day of the year, the CBOT is willing to make
federal funds futures contracts for the current
month and the following twenty-four calendar
months available for trade. In addition to these
twenty-five contracts, the CBOT may list two
additional contracts for the first two months of
March, June, September, and December that fol-
low the first twenty-five months. For example, a
June 2006 contract could be listed as early as
December 2003.
BOX 2
The Federal Funds Futures Market
46 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002However, contracts are rarely made so far from
settlement. Typically, trading volume and open inter-
est for federal funds futures are relatively low until
the contracts are within six months of settlement. 
Trading hours. Federal funds futures are
traded on the floor of the CBOT from Monday
through Friday between 7:20 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.
CST. Federal funds futures are also traded elec-
tronically at the CBOT from Sunday through
Friday between 8:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M. CST.
According to 2001 statistics, 98.7 percent of
CBOT federal funds futures were traded in tradi-
tional open outcry sessions—on the floor of the
exchange between traders shouting and using
hand signals. The remainder were traded on 
a/c/e (an abbreviation of Alliance/CBOT/Eurex),
an electronic exchange run as a joint venture
between the CBOT and Eurex exchanges.
Price basis. Federal funds futures prices are
expressed as 100 minus the expected average
effective federal funds rate for the delivery
month. For example, if a January contract has a
price of 92.75, it reflects an anticipated average
rate of 100 – 92.75 = 7.25 percent for that month. 
Tick size. Federal funds futures contract prices
are not allowed to move in increments smaller than
one-half of 1 basis point. A price movement of one-
half basis point, or a tick, is associated with a value
of $20.835. The value of $20.835, known as the tick
size, represents thirty days’ interest on $5 million
dollars at a rate of one-half of 1 basis point, based
on a 360-day year. The value is calculated as 0.5 ×
0.01 × 0.01 × $5,000,000 × (30/360) ≈ $20.835.
Thirty days’ interest is used to calculate the tick
size regardless of how many days are actually in
the contract month. This calculation produces a
constant tick size of $20.835 and gives the federal
funds futures their official name of “thirty-day
federal funds futures.”
Marking to market. The price movements of
federal funds futures result in unrealized gains
and losses for market participants. Each day after
the market closes, the CBOT squares the posi-
tions of contract buyers against sellers by assess-
ing the effect of the day’s price movement on
each participant’s holdings. Each participant’s
position is said to be marked to the market.
For each one-half basis point drop in price, a
contract buyer’s margin account will be reduced
by $20.835 per contract, and the contract seller’s
account will be credited by the same amount. An
increase in price will have opposite effects on
the buyer and the seller. For example, assume
an investor has bought five federal funds futures
BOX 2 (continued)
1. The daily effective federal funds rate is a transaction-weighted average of rates on brokered federal funds trades. These
data are available daily in Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15.
2. For more information on CBOT federal funds futures contracts, see Chicago Board of Trade (1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2002).
3. These assumptions for futures markets in general include costless transactions, riskless borrowing, and costless and per-
fect storage. See Duffie (1989, chap. 5) for the arbitrage argument.



















































































Volume of Current-Month Contractcontracts. If federal funds futures previously
closed at 92.75 and then fell to 92.55 at the end
of the trading day (a one-day decline of 20 basis
points, or 40 ticks), marking to market will
reduce the investor’s margin account by 5 × 40 ×
$20.835 = $4,167. 
Settlement. Federal funds futures contracts
can trade until the last business day of the contract
month. On the next business day, the positions of
contract buyers and sellers are cash settled accord-
ing to the final settlement price. As an example,
the June 2006 contract will stop trading on Friday,
June 30, 2006, and settle on Monday, July 3, 2006.
The settlement price is based on daily effec-
tive federal funds rates published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. The settlement price
is calculated as 100 minus the average effective
federal funds rate for the contract month, with
the most recent daily rate applied to any week-
ends or holidays. 
BOX 2 (continued)















































































































































Trading Positions, Year 2000
Note: Positions in federal funds futures in excess of 300 contracts must be reported to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.
Such reportable positions comprise more than 90 percent of open interest in federal funds futures. 
Source: Commodities Futures Trading Commission49 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
of futures prices to the variance of the underlying
federal funds rate. 
The general conclusion that emerges is that pre-
dictive accuracy and forecast error variances differ
over stages of the monetary policy cycle and at tran-
sition points in the trajectory of monetary policy.
Furthermore, the low variance of the target federal
funds rate over the latter half of the 1990s is primar-
ily responsible for the reduction in forecast error
bias and variance over this time period. The increased
disclosure of information by the FOMC appears to
have played a secondary role.
Forecast Errors from the Federal Funds
Futures Market
T
his discussion begins by looking at monthly
realized forecast errors over the sample, from
April 1989 through January 2002. Chart 1 displays the
realized forecast errors at the one-, two-, and three-
month horizons while Chart 2 shows the trailing
two-year moving averages of these forecast errors.
Forecast errors are constructed by taking the clos-
ing prices of futures contracts on the first business
day of each month and comparing them to their even-
tual settlement price. For example, for the month
of January 2001 the closing prices for the January,
February, and March futures contracts are collected
as of January 2, 2001. The difference between these
closing prices on January 2 and their respective
settlement prices on January 31, February 28, and
March 30 represent the one-, two-, and three-month
realized forecast errors. All forecast errors refer-
enced in subsequent sections use this convention.
Forecast errors are expressed in basis points, with
a positive error indicating that the forecast rate was
in excess of the realized average effective federal
funds rate.
As is clear from Charts 1 and 2, the futures mar-
ket’s predictive accuracy has fluctuated considerably
over the past twelve years. The bias and error vari-
ance declined through the mid-1990s before rising
in recent years. This variation motivates the subse-
quent inspection of federal funds futures market
forecast errors, which focuses closely on the behavior
of futures prices at different time periods over the
past thirteen years. The analysis also examines certain
factors that may have contributed to the changes in
bias and error variance.
Federal Funds Futures Market 
Predictive Accuracy and Bias
P
revious authors have concentrated on measur-
ing how well implied rates on federal funds
futures actually forecast the effective federal funds
rate. The nature of this prediction problem is more
complex than it might first appear (see Robertson
and Thornton 1997). Futures market participants
face the joint problem of correctly anticipating both
forthcoming economic data and the timing and
magnitude of the FOMC’s reaction to that data. To
make matters worse, federal funds futures contracts
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ing monetary policy. Using univariate and vector
autoregressions with data from June 1989 through
November 1994, Krueger and Kuttner find an average
bias of roughly 6 basis points at the one-month hori-
zon and 12 basis points at the two-month horizon,
rejecting the hypothesis of unbiased futures rates.
In contrast, the rationality hypothesis—that futures
prices incorporate all other relevant information—
appears to hold. Parameters on additional regres-
sors such as the consumer price index (CPI) or M2
growth are generally statistically insignificant. As
such, futures prices appear to correctly incorporate
the information useful for forecasting the funds rate
contained in these other macroeconomic variables. 
While these papers look at the predictive ability
of the federal funds futures market over subsequent
months, Söderström (2001) focuses on the forecast
accuracy of the futures market within the contract
month. Using daily data from October 1988 through
March 1998, Söderström tests the ability of implied
rates of federal funds futures to forecast the average
effective federal funds rate over the remainder of each
month. The analysis of daily data is complicated by
regularities in the federal funds market that can
generate predictable fluctuations in the effective
funds rate.2 Taking these fluctuations into account
through dummy variables, regression results show
futures prices are only modestly accurate in pre-
dicting the average effective funds rate over the
remainder of the month. Interestingly, if one looks
at dates near scheduled FOMC meetings, implied
funds rate over the contract month. The extent to
which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s open
market desk fails to keep the average of daily funds
rates close to the target specified by the FOMC
proves to be an additional source of potential fore-
cast error.1 Hence, tests of the forecast accuracy of
implied rates on federal funds futures contracts
should be seen as joint tests of forecasts of macro-
economic data, the reaction of the FOMC to these
data, and the precision with which the open market
desk keeps the effective funds rate close to its spec-
ified target rate. 
In an early descriptive paper, Carlson, McIntire,
and Thomson (1995) examine the predictive ability
of federal funds futures prices by comparing the
out-of-sample forecasting performance of a simple
autoregressive model of changes in the effective
federal funds rate with forecasts implied by federal
funds futures prices. Over their October 1988
through December 1994 sample, they find implied
rates on federal funds futures predict better on a
mean squared error basis than a simple random walk
model or a univariate autoregression. 
Krueger and Kuttner (1996) subsequently pursue
the same question in a more sophisticated manner.
They test whether futures market forecast errors
contain a bias and whether this bias can be explained
by other macroeconomic data such as employment
or industrial production. The latter test addresses
whether federal funds futures prices fully and effi-






















































































Moving Average of Realized Forecast Errors from the Federal Funds Futures Market1. For a general discussion of open market desk operations, see Fisher and Hilton (1999) and Edwards (1997).
2. See, for example, Griffiths and Winters (1995) and the references therein.
3. At the end of each subsample, forecast error observations are curtailed appropriately to assure that futures prices are not
expiring in months of the subsequent subsample.
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futures rates do a rather good job of predicting the
outcome of these meetings. Söderström goes one step
further and compares the predictive accuracy of the
futures market with that of the financial press, finding
the futures market to be the superior forecaster.
While insightful, these papers implicitly assume
that federal funds futures prices behave similarly
regardless of the path of the federal funds rate
underlying the futures contracts. This article sug-
gests that this assumption masks some interesting
variations in futures prices that are closely related
to the trajectory of monetary policy. By examining
futures prices between and around monetary policy
cycle turning points, this analysis finds considerable
differences in the forecast error and bias of implied
federal funds futures rates over the policy cycle.
Predictability over Segments of the 
Monetary Policy Cycle
U
.S. monetary policy in recent decades has been
characterized by cyclical swings in the federal
funds rate with periods of sustained rising, steady,
and declining funds rates. The predictive accuracy
of federal funds futures may be a function of policy
trajectory. For example, forecast errors might be
smaller during periods when the target federal funds
rate remained unchanged for a considerable period
of time relative to a period of increasing or declin-
ing target funds rates.
To examine this possibility, the sample here is
divided into fifteen segments: three periods of
rising federal funds rates, seven periods of steady
federal funds rates, and five periods of declining
federal funds rates. Beginning period dates that
correspond to days when the FOMC began a
series of similar interest rate moves demarcate the
samples. For example, January 3, 2001, marked
the beginning of a long decline in the target fed-
eral funds rate, which ended with a final 25 basis
point reduction on December 11, 2001. The FOMC
declined to change rates in subsequent meetings,
so December 12 marks the beginning of a new
period with a target federal funds rate steady at
1.75 percent. Chart 3 shows the cutoff dates for
the samples. One- and two-month-ahead forecast
errors and forecast error standard deviations for
each period are computed and shown in Table 1.3
Average forecasts errors are generally positive
over each subsample and nearby contract but vary
considerably by sample. 
To obtain a clearer pattern from the data, the
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Period  Number of Total number Group  Standard
Start date End date average observations of observations Median averagea deviationb
One-month-ahead contract errors
Declining federal funds rate periods
06 Jun 89 19 Dec 89 –2.50 5 —— — —
13 Jul 90 3 Sep 92 6.00 25 —— — —
06 Jul 95 30 Jan 96 –0.91 6 —— — —
29 Sep 98 16 Nov 98 15.00 1 —— — —
03 Jan 01 11 Dec 01 15.55 10 47 3 6.44 18.68
Steady federal funds rate periods
20 Dec 89 12 Jul 90 1.33 6 —— — —
04 Sep 92 3 Feb 94 3.56 16 —— — —
01 Feb 95 5 Jul 95 0.50 4 —— — —
31 Jan 96 24 Mar 97 3.76 13 —— — —
25 Mar 97 28 Sep 98 1.17 17 —— — —
17 Nov 98 29 Jun 99 4.86 7 —— — —
16 May 00 2 Jan 01 1.50 7 70 2.25 2.58 7.54
Rising federal funds rate periods
23 Feb 89 5 Jun 89 12.25 2 —— — —
04 Feb 94 31 Jan 95 7.32 11 —— — —
30 Jun 99 15 May 00 3.00 10 23 5.5 5.87 12.33
Two-month-ahead contract errors
Declining federal funds rate periods
06 Jun 89 19 Dec 89 –9.75 4 —— — —
13 Jul 90 03 Sep 92 21.19 24 —— — —
06 Jul 95 30 Jan 96 –3.60 5 —— — —
29 Sep 98 16 Nov 98 0.00 0 —— — —
03 Jan 01 11 Dec 01 30.83 9 42 19.25 17.36 31.57
Steady federal funds rate periods
20 Dec 89 12 Jul 90 4.80 5 —— — —
04 Sep 92 03 Feb 94 6.20 15 —— — —
01 Feb 95 05 Jul 95 5.16 3 —— — —
31 Jan 96 24 Mar 97 4.96 12 —— — —
25 Mar 97 28 Sep 98 3.75 16 —— — —
17 Nov 98 29 Jun 99 4.83 6 —— — —
16 May 00 02 Jan 01 5.58 6 63 4 4.99 10.55
Rising federal funds rate periods
23 Feb 89 05 Jun 89 34.00 1 —— — —
04 Feb 94 31 Jan 95 6.90 10 —— — —
30 Jun 99 15 May 00 2.11 9 20 4 6.10 15.50
a The unweighted average of observations from each subsample
b The unweighted standard deviation of observations from each subsample
TABLE 1
Realized Errors by Subsample4. More formal testing of the hypothesis requires an ex ante definition of the regimes. Although a Markov-switching (see
Hamilton 1994, chap. 22) or other regime-switching model may be able to provide such dates, this approach has not been
attempted. Consequently, the data above, based on the ex post definition of regimes, are merely descriptive.
5. The Chicago Board of Trade federal funds futures market ends its open outcry session at 3:00 P.M. EST while the timing of
most FOMC announcements is around 2:15 P.M. EST. As a robustness check, realized errors were also computed for the day
subsequent to target changes to verify that the market had time to fully incorporate the FOMC announcement. These results
were not appreciably different from the figures reported in Table 2.
6. See the empirical findings of Kuttner (2001), Rigobon and Sack (2002), and Bomfim and Reinhart (2000).
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behavior in the target federal funds rate (that is, a
rising, declining, or steady target rate). The pat-
tern that emerges for each nearby contract is one of
higher errors and error variances during declining
funds rate periods and slightly lower realized errors
and error variance over periods with a rising funds
rate. Sample periods characterized by a steady target
federal funds rate, however, have a substantially lower
average error and error variance. These data sug-
gest that the futures market forecast bias is influ-
enced to some degree by the stage of the monetary
policy cycle.4
Turning Points in Monetary Policy Trajectory 
T
he behavior of federal funds futures prices at
turning points in monetary policy trajectory is
also interesting. There are four such possible turn-
ing points: the beginning and end of an easing cycle
and the beginning and end of a tightening cycle. 
Turning points occur at the intersection of the sub-
sample periods defined above. Futures market clos-
ing prices are taken from the last day of the previous
subsample, providing a view of the futures market
term structure just prior to a change in the trajec-
tory of monetary policy and on the day of the target
change. For example, closing prices on the afternoon
of January 2 and 3, 2001, yield the futures market’s
view of expected monetary policy as the target federal
funds rate heads into a period of decline.5 Table 2
provides the realized forecast errors around each of
these turning points.
Chart 4 shows the daily behavior of implied rates
since the mid-1990s on the first through sixth nearby
federal funds futures contracts. The chart makes
clear that futures market participants often fail to
anticipate shifts in the trajectory of the target fed-
eral funds rate, typically overshooting at the end of
tightening or easing cycles and undershooting at
the beginning of tightening or easing cycles. Such
behavior is not particularly surprising. The market
is trying to predict the timing and magnitude of pol-
icy shifts that are functions of macroeconomic data
that are as yet unknown and notoriously difficult to
forecast. However, this overshooting or undershoot-
ing is important in asset pricing since expectations
for the path of the funds rate are incorporated into
the term structure of short-term debt instruments
and to a lesser magnitude into exchange rates, equi-
ties, and longer-term borrowing rates.6
Beginning of tightening cycles. At the two
beginnings of tightening cycles in the sample, mixed
evidence of undershooting is seen. Prior to the turn-
ing point in February 1994, futures market partici-
pants had begun to price in a rise in the target funds
rate. Despite this adjustment, the market did not
correctly anticipate the speed or magnitude of the
subsequent rise in the funds rate, resulting in nega-
tive realized forecast errors. This episode contrasts
with the situation in June 1999 (see Chart 5A),
when futures prices proved amazingly accurate, pre-
dicting the correct effective funds rate within 6 basis
points at the six-month horizon. 
End of tightening cycles. The behavior of
futures prices around the end of the two tightening
cycles displays substantial overshooting. As Charts 4
and 5B show, at those turning points, futures mar-
ket participants anticipated a continued climb in
the federal funds rate. At the six-month horizon the
realized forecast error proved to be almost 100 basis
points in February 1995 and roughly 50 basis points
in May 2000.
Beginning of easing cycles. Data around the
beginning of the four easing cycles are a bit more
heterogeneous. The turning point in July 1990 cor-
responds to the easing cycle during the 1990–91
recession and shows that market participants gen-
erally anticipated a sharper decline in the target
funds rate than what actually occurred. The realized
Predictive accuracy and forecast error vari-
ances differ over stages of the monetary
policy cycle and at transition points in the
trajectory of monetary policy.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
Current Current Current Current Current Current 
month month + 1 month + 2 month + 3 month + 4 month + 5
Day prior to the turning point
Beginning of tightening cycle
03 Feb 94 –7.5 –7.5 –21.5 –58.0 –69.5 –66.5
29 Jun 99 1.5 6.5 3.0 –2.5 8.0 –6.0
End of tightening cycle
31 Jan 95 –0.5 4.5 6.5 20.5 40.0 63.0
15 May 00 –4.0 –4.5 18.5 30.0 41.0 50.5
Beginning of easing cycle
12 Jul 90 7.5 –2.5 –16.5 –11.5 17.5 67.5
05 Jul 95 1.0 4.5 –18.5 –20.5 –30.5 3.0
28 Sep 98 –1.5 11.0 27.5 33.5 30.5 –3.5
02 Jan 01 39.0 53.0 60.5 84.5 134.5 143.5
End of easing cycle
19 Dec 89 17.5 10.0 –9.5 –24.5 –30.5 N/A
03 Feb 94 –7.5 –7.5 –21.5 –58.0 –69.5 –66.5
30 Jan 96 1.0 11.5 –1.5 –8.5 –16.5 –33.5
16 Nov 98 10.5 17.5 21.5 –10.5 –17.0 –13.5
Special case
24 Mar 97 –5.5 –4.5 1.5 4.5 18.0 21.0
Day of the turning point
Beginning of tightening cycle
04 Feb 94 2.5 1.5 –13.5 –51.0 –60.5 –58.5
30 Jun 99 0.5 2.5 –2.0 –9.5 0.0 –14.0
End of tightening cycle
01 Feb 95 9.5 8.5 26.5 44.0 66.0 99.0
16 May 00 –1.5 –0.5 23.0 33.5 45.0 54.0
Beginning of easing cycle
13 Jul 90 –0.5 –11.5 –25.5 –19.5 7.5 62.5
06 Jul 95 0.0 –2.5 –28.5 –32.5 –43.5 –12.0
29 Sep 98 –1.5 17.0 33.5 38.5 34.5 1.5
03 Jan 01 4.5 24.0 34.5 63.0 114.5 129.5
End of easing cycle
20 Dec 89 11.5 0.0 –14.5 –31.5 –35.5 N/A
04 Feb 94 2.5 1.5 –13.5 –51.0 –60.5 –58.5
31 Jan 96 0.5 4.5 –7.5 –15.5 –23.5 –41.5
17 Nov 98 8.0 11.5 16.5 –15.5 –21.0 –16.5
Special case
25 Mar 97 –5.0 –0.5 3.5 8.5 23.0 26.0
TABLE 2
Realized Forecast Errors Around Selected Turning Points55 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002




























































Recent Behavior of Implied Rates of Federal Funds Futures
CHART 5
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prices reflected further easing in October. At that
time, market participants expected the FOMC to
continue to reduce the target rate in its ongoing
response to the Asian crisis. Expectations for fur-
ther cuts moderated as November progressed,
though, and by the time of the final 25 basis point
cut for this easing cycle in late November, futures
prices were reflecting a reasonably accurate fore-
cast of the subsequent steady funds rate period
(see Chart 5D).7
A special case. One special case that does not
fit into the other categories is also worth noting: the
slight upward adjustment in the funds rate in March
1997. Given the typical FOMC behavior of following
one rate move with subsequent moves in the same
direction, the single 25 basis point uptick in the
funds rate shifted the slope of the futures term
structure up substantially as market participants
began to anticipate further tightening of monetary
policy (see Chart 4). Subsequent FOMC decisions
to hold the target funds rate steady at 5.5 percent
resulted in positive forecast errors.
Most recently, the futures market accurately
predicted the end of the sharp easing cycle that
began on January 3, 2001. On the first business
day of December 2001, the implied rate on the
January federal funds futures contract was 1.77
percent. This rate proved just 4 basis points higher
than the settlement price of the January 2002
futures contract. 
FOMC Disclosure Policy 
R
ecently, Thornton (1996), Poole and Raasche
(2000), Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2001), and
Poole, Raasche, and Thornton (2001) have used
federal funds futures data to argue that recent
changes in FOMC operating procedures have
helped synchronize market expectations of mone-
tary policy with realized changes in the federal
funds rate. Among the changes in procedure over
the last decade are the shifts toward changing the
federal funds rate at regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings, making these changes in multiples of 25
basis points, publicly announcing the change in the
funds rate, and issuing a statement of bias toward
inflation or output weakness. A decline in average
forecast errors following these institutional changes,
controlling for other factors, would be evidence to
support the contention that greater transparency
in policy making has allowed the financial markets
to more correctly forecast policy changes. Such
greater synchronicity should minimize the mispric-
ing of financial assets and result in a more efficient
capital allocation.
errors for the two- and three-month-ahead con-
tracts are subject to two interpretations. First, they
may simply reflect the expectation that the funds
rate would not fall as sharply as it eventually did.
Alternatively, these figures may be viewed with
skepticism given the extremely low trading volume
of the two- and three-month-ahead contracts only
a few months after these instruments began trad-
ing at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). In fact,
the average daily trading volumes for these con-
tracts in July 1990 were only 60 and 14, respec-
tively, making the latter interpretation, arguably,
the more reasonable one. 
The realized errors around the beginning of the
easing cycle in July 1995 are also unusual. Futures
market participants were anticipating a series of
steady declines in the target funds rate, but the
FOMC chose to reduce the funds rate by only 25
basis points and to wait a number of months
before making additional reductions. This some-
what atypical behavior largely explains the under-
shooting exhibited by futures prices around this
turning point. 
The remaining two observations at the beginning
of easing cycles in September 1998 and January
2001 display a substantial degree of overshooting.
At the three-month horizon, futures market fore-
casts missed by roughly 27 and 60 basis points,
respectively. More dramatic is the degree to which
futures prices failed to forecast the quick and sharp
reduction in the funds rate over 2001 (see Chart 5C),
when the six-month-ahead error proved a stagger-
ing 143 basis points.
End of easing cycles. For the end of easing
cycles, futures prices generally show undershooting,
with the market anticipating additional reductions
to the federal funds rate that do not materialize. At
the close of the easing cycles in December 1989,
February 1994, and January 1996, futures market
projections undershot by 31, 51, and 15 basis
points, respectively, at the four-month horizon.
November 1998 was an exception, when futures
The futures market forecast performance
appears to be influenced substantially by the
smoothness of the federal funds rate and
perhaps to a much lesser extent by changes
in FOMC operating procedures.7. One conclusion is that the seemingly systematic large positive forecast errors found in July, September, and December over
the sample studied by Söderström (2001) may merely reflect the forecast errors around turning points and segments of the
policy cycle that have happened to occur more often in these months. Consequently, this previous finding should disappear
as the sample grows larger.
8. Thornton (1996) also makes this observation and performs a more limited analysis than that conducted here.
9. See Hamilton (1994, chap. 21) for an introduction to ARCH models.
10. This approach is along the lines of that seen in Thornton (1996).
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Target Funds Rate Variance 
A
s evidenced by the declining forecast errors in
Chart 2, futures market participants’ ability to
forecast the path of the federal funds rate improved
considerably in the latter half of the 1990s.
Common explanations include the increased vol-
ume and open interest of the thirty-day federal
funds futures contract over this time as well as the
changes in the disclosure policy of the FOMC begin-
ning around 1994. 
One factor that is often overlooked, however, is
that the variance of the federal funds rate has
changed significantly in recent years.8 Taking a
quick look at the path of the federal funds rate over
the past thirteen years (see Chart 3), one observes
much larger swings in the federal funds rate in the
period from 1988 through 1994 than over the later
half of the 1990s. The question then arises whether
the futures market’s improved predictive accuracy
in some recent years is in part a function of the
smoothness of the underlying target federal funds
rate rather than institutional changes or increased
market depth. Chart 6 plots estimated conditional
variances arising from GARCH (1,1) models of both
the monthly changes in the federal funds rate and
the one-month-ahead futures market forecast errors.9
The positive correlation between these series sug-
gests that the variability of the funds rate is a key
factor explaining the variance and possibly the mean
of futures market forecast errors. 
One approach to addressing this question is to
examine futures forecast accuracy relative to a
baseline autoregressive model whose forecast accu-
racy improves as the funds rate path becomes
smoother.10 A relative comparison of the forecast
errors of each should measure the forecasting
improvement of futures market prices due to dis-
closure and/or liquidity changes rather than the
reduced variance in the federal funds rate.
Chart 7 shows the ratio of the root mean squared
errors (RMSE) for one-month-ahead forecasts from
the federal funds futures market and a simple second-
order autoregressive model, AR(2), using first differ-
ences of the funds rate:∆fft= β0+β1∆fft–1+β2∆fft–2+εt.
Although the futures market forecasts performed
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The events of September 11 clearly added con-
siderable uncertainty to the federal funds futures
market, increasing realized forecast errors in the
latter half of 2001. To assess whether the deterio-
ration in the relative forecasting accuracy of futures
market prices was primarily due to these events,
the 2001 sample is curtailed in August and the rela-
tive RMSE is recomputed using only the first eight
months of the year. From January 2001 to August
2001 the relative RMSE rose to 1.05, almost identi-
cal to the full-year estimate. 
It appears then that as the path of the target fed-
eral funds rate becomes smoother the futures mar-
ket’s ability to forecast target rate movements
improves relative to forecasts from a simple AR(2)
model of the funds rate. However, significant depar-
tures from a relatively smooth funds rate path
result in a proportionately larger deterioration in
futures market forecasts accuracy relative to the
AR(2) model’s projections. 
While the relative RMSE results are suggestive,
a more formal investigation of the influences on
futures market forecast errors is necessary to
quantify the impact of changes in FOMC operating
procedure and contract trading volume on fore-
cast errors. To do so, the realized one-, two-, and
three-month-ahead forecast errors are modeled as
functions of previous errors, monthly average trad-
ing volume, concurrent and subsequent changes
in the federal funds rate, and an institutional dummy
variable (equal to one for 1995 to present), which
the early 1990s, with the ratio of RMSEs ranging
from roughly 0.7 to 1.1, the futures market’s relative
forecasting performance improved considerably
in subsequent years.11 From 1996 through 2000 the
average RMSE ratio fell to 0.52 from the 0.84 level
seen over the previous six years. Indeed, the rela-
tive RMSE appears to be trending lower over the
course of the 1990s, a movement indicative of
continued improvement in forecast accuracy by
futures market participants even after taking into
account the smoother path of the target funds
rate in the latter half of the decade. This observa-
tion is consistent with the hypotheses of Poole and
Raasche (2000), who suggest that recent changes
in the FOMC’s operating procedure lead to greater
synchronicity between the Federal Reserve and the
capital markets.
This picture changed significantly in 2001, how-
ever. In early January the FOMC began a series of
rapid and sharp reductions in the target federal
funds rate. Although the futures market anticipated
the January cut to some degree (see realized turn-
ing point errors in Table 2 and Chart 5C), the mag-
nitude and speed of the subsequent target rate
declines were generally missed by a considerable
margin (see the final subsample average error in
Table 1). As Chart 7 depicts, the relative forecast-
ing performance of federal funds futures prices
deteriorated significantly, proving no better than















Average RMSE ratio 
1990–1995 = 0.84
Average RMSE ratio
full sample = 0.73
CHART 7
Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) Ratio—Futures Market RMSE/Fed Funds AR(2) RMSE11. Forecasts are computed from a rolling sample starting in January 1983. An additional year of data is added to each sample.
For each set of parameter estimates, static one-month-ahead forecasts are computed for the subsequent twelve months.
Mean squared errors are then calculated from these projections.
12. These conclusions are robust to different specifications of the dummy variable and transformations of the volume series.
While trading volume is highly significant in the one-month-ahead equation, an inspection of its recursive +/– two standard
error bands shows these bounding zero through all but the last few observations.
13. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Bomfim and Reinhart (2000) that it is the actual changes in monetary pol-
icy that elicit a market response. The public announcements that accompany these changes are of second-order importance.
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serves as a proxy for FOMC disclosure changes.
The parsimonious models that best fit the data
take the form 
ffferrort
+1 = β0 + β1 ffferrort–1
+1 + β2volt–1
+1 + β3dum
+ β4∆fft + β5∆fft–1 + εt,
ffferrort
+2 = β0 + β1ffferrort–1
+2 + β2volt–1
+2 + β3dum
+ β4∆fft + β5∆fft+1 + εt,
ffferrort




+3 + β4dum + β5∆fft + β6∆fft+1
+ β7fft+2 + εt,
where  ffferrort
+i is the realized federal funds
futures forecast error looking i months into the
future at month t, ∆fft is the change in the effective
federal funds rate at month t, volt–1
+i is the average
monthly futures market volume for the ith nearby
contract, and dum is the dummy variable. Volume
is lagged one month since the futures data are taken
from the first day of each month. 
If the arguments of Poole and Raasche (2000) are
correct, the recent changes in FOMC operating pro-
cedures should be a statistically significant factor in
the decline in forecast errors over the latter half of
the 1990s. The regression results in Table 3, how-
ever, do not support this contention. The coefficients
on both the institutional dummy variable and CBOT
trading volume figures generally prove insignificantly
different from zero, suggesting that, when one con-
trols for other factors influencing futures market
forecast errors, these variables have little explanatory
power.12 The factor found to be most influential was,
unsurprisingly, changes in the federal funds rate on
the month the contract expires. 
Combined, the relative RMSE approach and the
regression results above suggest that the major fac-
tor driving the forecast errors in the federal funds
futures market is the variation in the funds rate
rather than the institutional changes or increased
trading volume that some argued have facilitated
futures market forecast accuracy in recent years.13
These results, however, are merely suggestive. Insti-
tutional changes are extremely difficult to proxy
for in a statistical model. The choice here of a zero-
one-dummy variable is by all measures a very blunt
instrument. Consequently, the question of the impact
of changes in FOMC operating procedures is still
an important and open one.
Summary
T
he federal funds futures market, while allow-
ing market participants to hedge interest rate
risk, also serves the important role of revealing
market participants’ expectations of changes in
FOMC policy. Armed with this information, mone-
tary policymakers are able to assess the degree to
which asset prices already reflect potential policy
moves and, consequently, the likely reaction of
asset prices to monetary policy changes that devi-
ate from market expectations. 
Previous papers have shown the federal funds
futures market to be a relatively good forecaster of
changes in the path of the federal funds rate on
average. These studies, however, have been based
on entire samples of futures market data (typically
through only the mid-1990s) and fail to take into
account the significant changes in forecast errors
behavior over different periods of the last thirteen
years. A detailed look at the futures market forecast
performance shows substantial variation in forecast
bias and error variance over different stages of the
monetary policy cycle. In addition, the data reveal
both substantial overshooting and undershooting by
futures prices around turning points in the path of
the funds rate. Finally, the futures market forecast
performance appears to be influenced substantially
by the smoothness of the federal funds rate and
perhaps to a much lesser extent by changes in
FOMC operating procedures and increased liquidity
in the federal funds futures market. 60 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability
One-month-ahead forecast error
C 2.689563 1.479424 0.1412
ffferror1 (–1) 0.034049 0.297446 0.7665
vol (–1) 0.001390 2.433264 0.0162
dum –1.409398 –0.699632 0.4853
∆ff –0.443369 –8.049077 0.0000
∆ff (–1) 0.252181 2.964181 0.0035
R2..................................................0.360236 Mean dependent variable....................................4.674342
Adjusted R2 ....................................0.338326 Standard deviation dependent variable...............13.505980
Standard error of regression............10.98621 Akaike information criterion.................................7.669833
Sum squared residual ....................17621.74 Schwarz criterion ................................................7.789196
Log likelihood................................–576.9073 F-statistic .........................................................16.441830
Durbin-Watson statistic....................2.001058 Probability (F-statistic).........................................0.000000
Two-month-ahead forecast error
C 3.723522 1.359174 0.1762
ffferror2 (–1) 0.302252 3.125770 0.0021
vol (–1) –0.000654 –0.515126 0.6072
dum 0.681652 0.215542 0.8296
∆ff 0.090424 0.769210 0.4430
∆ff (+1) –0.663521 –7.232132 0.0000
R2..................................................0.473981 Mean dependent variable....................................9.621711
Adjusted R2 ....................................0.455966 Standard deviation dependent variable...............21.613020
Standard error of regression............15.94147 Akaike information criterion.................................8.414398
Sum squared residual.....................37103.04 Schwarz criterion ................................................8.533762
Log likelihood................................–633.4943 F-statistic .........................................................26.311270
Durbin-Watson statistic....................1.793892 Probability (F-statistic).........................................0.000000
Three-month-ahead forecast error
C 6.837350 2.790652 0.0060
ffferror3 (–1) 0.653612 6.767882 0.0000
ffferror3 (–2) –0.256000 –3.829814 0.0002
vol (–1) 0.003808 1.465005 0.1451
dum –4.304001 –1.422083 0.1572
∆ff 0.196797 2.009983 0.0463
∆ff (+1) –0.148278 –0.997209 0.3204
∆ff (+2) –0.675044 –8.983938 0.0000
R2..................................................0.696037 Mean dependent variable..................................15.183330
Adjusted R2 ....................................0.681053 Standard deviation dependent variable...............29.617780
Standard error of regression............16.72676 Akaike information criterion.................................8.523756
Sum squared residual.....................39729.41 Schwarz criterion ................................................8.684323
Log likelihood................................–631.2817 F-statistic .........................................................46.451700
Durbin-Watson statistic....................2.168766 Probability (F-statistic).........................................0.000000
Note: For the one-month-ahead forecast error, the dependent variable is ffferror1, the sample (adjusted) is 1989:06–2002:01, and the
number of included observations is 152 after adjusting endpoints. For the two-month-ahead forecast error, the dependent variable is
ffferror2, the sample (adjusted) is 1989:06–2001:12, and the number of included observations is 152 after adjusting endpoints. For the
three-month-ahead forecast error, the dependent variable is ffferror3, the sample (adjusted) is 1989:06–2001:11, and the number of
included observations is 150 after adjusting endpoints. All results use Newey-West HAC standard errors.
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